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Abstract

Mr. Andrew Crown-Weber’s essay, “Autopoesis: Self-Creation in
Nietzsche,” was easily the best and most original essay I have received from any of my undergraduate students in several years.  
He wrote the essay as a term paper for my class on “Nietzsche:
First to Last,” and the paper reveals a sophisticated and broad grasp not
just of Nietzsche’s entire corpus (an impressive enough feat in its own
right), but also of the difficult issues and problems that surround the
favorite Nietzschean injunction to “become who you are.”   Mr. CrownWeber does a fine job of sorting out and criticizing the implications of
both the “essentialist” and “existentialist” theories of self-hood, and he
demonstrates convincingly that Nietzsche actually adheres most closely
to the latter, while still employing some of the language of the former.  
Mr. Crown-Weber also has the courage to take on one of the leading
lights among contemporary Nietzsche scholars (Brian Leiter), and, in my
view, he successfully demolishes Leiter’s influential “fatalistic” and “naturalistic” account of Nietzsche’s view of the self.  Mr. Crown-Weber’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s denial of free will as a part of his campaign against
Christianity is interesting and provocative, and his novel interpretation of
the “automatic” and “aesthetic” dimensions of Nietzschean self-creation
is very promising and original.  Equally impressive is his suggestion that
the value of an “egoistic” act depends on the value of the person who performs it.  Surely this goes to the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and Mr.
Crown-Weber offers a sympathetic and insightful discussion of this point
with a nuanced response to several anticipated objections to the same.   
Finally, this essay is a pleasure to read.  It is artfully composed and
beautifully written.  
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Nietzsche
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A recurrent theme in the philosophy of Friedrich
Nietzsche is his imperative that we must create
ourselves. Though this theme of self-creation runs
throughout   the entirety of his published works,
Nietzsche neither fully articulates in one place
the processes and guidelines by which such selfcreation could occur, nor does he fully resolve the
paradoxes inherent in this concept. This paper
attempts to distill from these fragments a coherent
interpretation of both how we can and why we
should, despite (or, paradoxically, because of) our
many external and internal constraints, fashion
ourselves the way an artist shapes a work of art.

Introduction
Throughout his works, one of Friedrich Nietzsche’s
most common and consistent calls was for his readers to create themselves — at least those capable of
creating themselves. We hear the first notes of this
call sounded in Nietzsche’s first published work,
The Birth of Tragedy, when Nietzsche talks of our
“status as art works” and how the “genius in the
act of creation” becomes “at once subject, object,
poet, actor and audience.” This idea of shaping oneself as an “aesthetic phenomena” (BT, 5) is finally
announced explicitly by the middle period when
Nietzsche asserts: “We, however, want to become
those we are — human beings who are new, unique,
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves” (GS, 335). Here we see Nietzsche
adding nuances to this idea, knotting together his
maxim “become who you are” with the project of
self-creation. As we shall see, self-creation is the
means by which one becomes what one is. Even
in Nietzsche’s last productive year we find him giving Goethe the highest praise when he announces
that Goethe “disciplined himself to wholeness, he
created himself” (TI, IX, 49). This essay will first
examine Nietzsche’s conception of the self and then
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turn to how Nietzsche believes we can create ourselves
and why he believes we should. In order to understand
what Nietzsche means by ‘self-creation’ we will need
to examine that self’s interaction with the external
world and grapple with many seeming contradictions
in Nietzsche’s philosophy that threaten to muddle this
encomium into meaninglessness.

The Self

We face our first contradiction when looking at
Nietzsche’s view of the self. At first blush he seems
to give both an ‘essentialist’ and an ‘existentialist’
account of the self. An essentialist account is one
in which each person has an essential core, a True
Self, which lies at ‘the base’ of the personality and
character, analogous to the Christian concept of ‘the
soul.’ This essential core, because it is an extremely
specific entity, is static, unchanging, and therefore it
is often associated with the concept of ‘Being,’ that
is, something eternal and otherworldly, the prime
example of Being being God. The existentialist account of the self is contained in the phrase ‘existence
precedes essence.’ Existentialists deny the existence
of any essential self, typically because they deny the
existence of any essential Being in the world, which
is typically the source of the essential self. Without
the boundaries of essence, the self dynamically changes
over time.
Nietzsche seems to use the language of essentialism when he says that each person has “a productive
uniqueness within him at the core of his being” (UM,
143) or urges people to “Be yourself! All that you are now
doing, thinking, and desiring is not really yourself” (UM,
127). These both imply a ‘true’ self outside of current
appearances. However, when we examine Nietzsche’s
philosophy as a whole, we find that Nietzsche’s account
of the self leans toward the existentialist conception and
favors the dynamic model.
Thus, we see Nietzsche asserting that “the unalterable character,” a hallmark of the static conception of
self, “is not in the strict sense true” (HH, 41). He believes
it is only laziness and the shortness of life that lead us
to delude ourselves into thinking of our character and
ourselves as given, monolithic facts. As he says: “Man
becomes that which he wills to become, his willing precedes his existence” (HH, 35). This statement not only
shows the malleability of the self but allows that our will
has a shaping power to direct our becoming. It is within
this framework that Nietzsche can metaphorically cast
us as both creators and created works of art — though,
as we shall see, the actual agency and autonomy of this
‘creative will’ will come into question.
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Nietzsche’s uses of essentialist tropes are the exceptions that prove the rule of his dynamic conception of
self. He uses essentialist rhetoric as a skillful means of
encouraging us, because it is reassuring to believe the
fiction of having a ‘true’ self one only needs to find — for
this frees us of the responsibility of creation by saying
we need only uncover this self. However, at bottom, Nietzsche concurs with Zarathustra when he says: “Some
souls one will never discover, unless one invents them
first” (Z, 154). Thus the ‘to be’ in the mixed message
maxim “become who you are,” can be understood as an
ideal, unattainable shaping of our becoming in such a
way that one “create[s] and carr[ies] together into One
what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident” (Z,
252) in order to approximate the perfection associated
with the idea of ‘soul’ or ‘true self’.
Nietzsche’s view differs from the prototypical
existentialist account of the self, embodied in Sartre’s
philosophy. For Sartre, we choose what we become
and are therefore responsible for every aspect of our
becoming, of our self.   Nietzsche does not take such
a radical stand. Although I will argue that Nietzsche
does believe we can choose aspects of what we become,
there are undeniable determinants of our behavior that
limit our ability to choose. These determinants include
the totality of external events outside of our control, or
‘fate,’ or unchosen but fundamental internal aspects of
ourselves, such as our genetics and drives. For Nietzsche,
the autonomy necessary for self-creation will have to
occur within the constraints of unchosen external and
internal factors.
It is precisely regarding the issue of our autonomy
that Brian Leiter raises a paradox that questions the
possibility of self-creation. Nietzsche’s troubling and
unclear position toward determinism and fatalism questions the autonomy considered necessary for a person to
create him or herself. To use Leiter’s example: If I were
brainwashed into becoming a criminal, though I would
be causally responsible for the criminal activity, we
would not intuitively say that I had ‘created’ myself as a
criminal. Leiter claims that: “Nietzsche the fatalist views
a person like a plant: just as… the essential natural facts
about a tomato plant determine its development… so
too the essential natural facts about a person determine
its development” (Leiter, 223). These natural facts are
‘causally primary,’ that is: “they are necessary for [an]
effect… though they may not be sufficient for it” (Leiter,
224). Thus one must necessarily have the natural fact of
tallness to become an NBA center, although this is alone
is not sufficient for becoming one. This brings us to the
paradox: “If a person’s life trajectories are determined
in advance by the natural facts about himself, then how
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can a person really create himself, i.e., how can he make
an autonomous causal contribution to the course of that
life?” (Leiter, 226).
From this perspective we can’t really create ourselves, for the requirement of ‘autonomy’ would require
a causa sui origin outside of the chain of all previous
causes and effects — something so impossible that
Nietzsche himself goes so far as to call the idea a “rape
and perversion of logic” (BGE, I, 23). However from this
perspective nothing is ever created, for even the doodling
of a smiley face would, from this perspective, be said
to be a non-autonomous and therefore non-creative
act. Therefore, if Nietzsche subscribed to this view and
yet still speaks about creation at all, we must accept
that autonomy is not essential to his understanding of
creation. This, I will argue, does not scuttle the whole
project of self-creation in Nietzsche. This is why I believe
‘autopoiesis’ captures Nietzsche’s view of self-creation
the best. Aside from being in the language of his beloved Greeks, the ‘poiesis’ not only denotes creation but
connotes poetry, recalling the aesthetic aspect of such
creation. The ‘auto’ not only means simply ‘self,’ but also
connotes a certain ‘automatic’ involuntary aspect of this
self-creation, again highlighting Nietzsche’s lowlighting
of agency and emphasis on fatedness.
Nietzsche’s main impetus for problematizing free
will comes not from his ‘naturalism’ (a role in which
Leiter the naturalist is eager to cast him) but from its
association with Christianity, and therefore slave morality — those eternally recurrent bogeymen in Nietzsche’s
writings. The idea of the absolute freedom of the individual to choose is derived from the Christian solution
to the ‘Problem of Evil,’ namely: If God is both all-good
and all-powerful, why does evil occur? If he is all good
and ‘wants’ good for all, then he must not be powerful
enough to bring this about. If he is all-powerful and could
banish evil, then he must choose not to and is therefore
not all-good. The Christian solution is to say that God is
both all-good and all-powerful, but he gave humans the
free will to choose to obey his laws. Evil exists because
humans choose not to obey God. Nietzsche of course
rejects this entire account. His problematizing of free will
is an attempt to swing this pendulum of thought back
to a Classical Greek view – the view of fate we find in
Aeschylus in which the workings of the world are deeply
mysterious and “in which Moira [fate], as eternal justice,
is seen enthroned above men and gods alike” (BT, 9).
Nietzsche holds that we currently overemphasize agency
and do not recognize the extent to which unchosen
events, both external and internal, play a decisive role
in what we do, and thus, who we become.
Nietzsche has Zarathustra announce: “Body am I
entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for
something about the body… The body is a great rea-
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son, a plurality with one sense” while our reason and
consciousness is a subservient “little reason” which is
a “toy of [our] great reason” (Z, 147). But though “our
organism is an oligarchy” (GM, II, 1) with ‘mind’ subservient to ‘body,’ the fatedness of our big reason and
by extension the fate of the universe, the little reason
still has a limited freedom of will. Metaphorically it has
the power to nudge in one direction, but not the ability
to shove and certainly not the absolute power to steer.
To use a nautical metaphor, the idea of absolute freewill
is the illusory idea that we are like the captains of a
nuclear-powered ship able to go at full impulse in any
direction we like. Nietzsche’s view is that we are rather
like captains of a sailboat, who cannot sail against the
wind of fate but still have the responsibility of tacking
a course within those winds.
As ever, the important consideration for Nietzsche is
your response to ‘the way the universe is,’ whether you
affirm the necessitude of the existent or gnash your teeth
at it. In what I consider Nietzsche’s definitive take on
the paradox of free will and fate, he discusses ‘Mohammedan fatalism,’ which “embodies the fundamental error
of setting man and fate over against one another as two
separate things.” Against this error, Nietzsche proposes
that man and his ‘free will’ are a part of fate itself and
thus the seeming “struggle” and paradox of ‘free will’
versus ‘fate’ “is imaginary” (WS, 61). Both “free will”
and the “unfree will” (BGE, I, 21) are, as we will briefly
touch on later, simplifications and falsifications of the
world, owing to the limited perspective from which we
can experience, and therefore come to know something
about, the universe. Consider the following:
You have to believe in fate… what then
grows out of this belief in your case — cowardice, resignation or frankness and magnanimity
— bears witness to the soil upon which the
seedcorn has been scattered but not, however,
to the seedcorn itself — for out of this anything
and everything can grow (HH, 332).
This quote suggests that the important question
is not whether or not we have autonomy, but how
we psychologically respond to a world in which our
answers to this dilemma are uncertain.  The weak and
slavish response is one of resignation while the strong
and masterful response is one of boldness and a faith
that we are ones who can become who we are, who are
‘turning out well,’ for “it is only a matter of strong and
weak wills” (BGE, I, 21) and few possess the necessary
strength of will for self-creation. “Everyone possesses
inborn talent, but few possess the degree of inborn and
acquired toughness, endurance and energy actually to
become a talent, that is to say to become what he is:
which means to discharge it in works and actions” (HH
I, 263). Here we see Nietzsche denying the treasured
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shibboleth that “all men are created equal” — it is only
the “few” who possess the “inborn” and thus unchosen
means of becoming who they are. But how do you know
if you have this inborn talent? You find yourself in the
same bind that Calvinist believers in predestination find
themselves: you can’t know for certain. One has to have
faith in being ‘chosen’ and one shows this faith by acting
like a ‘chosen’ person would act. In the same way, a test
for whether you have this inborn “toughness, endurance and energy” is whether, in response to this quote,
you say “Yes” and go out and manifest these qualities
or instead say “No” and do not engage in the activities
of self-becoming, demonstrating a lack of said inborn
faculties. There are either ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ responses to
the question of inborn capacity. “He has no spirit who
seeks spirit” (HH, 547). That is, if you don’t think you
have that capacity, then you don’t.
Incidentally, I believe a great amount of Nietzsche’s
appeal to readers stems from his conspiratorial ‘us versus them’ style of writing, which implies, though never
states explicitly, that his reader must be one of the few
— presumably by virtue of having the good taste to read
Nietzsche! And because you have the good taste to be
reading my words, we’ll assume that we’re both one of
the few capable of creating ourselves…

How We Can Create Ourselves

To become a self-creator we must first analyze the
material we have to work with: we do this by analyzing ourselves with an intellectual conscience to
find what values, drives, and virtues constitute us.  
We have to find what makes us a “unique miracle”
(UM, 127). First of all, Nietzsche does not believe this
kind of introspection can ever be complete, for “nothing… can be more incomplete than” a person’s “image
of the totality of drives that constitute his being” (D,
116). However this is a good thing. People who delude
themselves into believing they know exactly who they
are create a self-fulfilling prophecy causing them to
actually become that. Because Nietzsche believes that
life is a process of seeking to grow, expand, and increase
one’s power, taking “know thyself” to the extreme of
actually believing we do know ourselves fully can freeze
the potentiality of our becoming by pouring it into one
static mold. Growth demands leeway. As Zarathustra
puts it: “One must still have chaos in oneself to be able
to give birth to a dancing star” (Z, Pr., 5).
After this introspection, we must move on to do as
“[a]ctive, successful natures” do, who “act, not according to the dictum “know thyself” but… “will a self and
thou shalt become a self” (HH, II, 366). Because we are
what we do, or as Nehamas puts it, “the sum total of
qualities that can be attributed to us,” willing a self, and
therefore self-creation, will mean changing and control-
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ling what we do in order to “give style” to our character
by “survey[ing] the strengths and weaknesses of [our]
nature and then fit[ing] them into an artistic plan” and
according to a “single taste” (GS, 290).
One method of achieving this is to examine what
has guided our actions heretofore, that is to say, our
morality. The creators must examine what “tablets of
values” they have lived by and, if necessary, destroy
those tablets that impede our self-creation. The creators
will then posit their own ‘Yes’ and ‘No,’ their own
‘straight line’ and ‘goal’ (TI, I, 44), that is they will posit
an ideal conception of who they want to become and
create for themselves a morality that will allow them
to achieve this conception. From thence forth, what is
‘good’ will be what moves them toward this goal, this
will be their “own categorical imperative” (A, 11). At
first this may sound extremely disturbing from a ‘moral’
standpoint, but as we will see later, this is not nearly as
ghoulish as it sounds. This is merely a recognition that
our morality and our self interpenetrate. Like Escher’s
image of the two hands drawing each other, we both
create our values and our values create us. This is what
Zarathustra means when he says: “To value is to create”
[schätzen ist schaffen] (Z, 177) and why Nietzsche calls
self-creators those who “give themselves laws, who
create themselves” (GS, 335).
“Every morality is… a bit of tyranny against “nature”” (BGE, 290). This tyranny channels our becoming
toward our goal. Thus we should submit to our selfposited moralities the way a poet submits to writing
a haiku, for it is within the restrictions of 17 syllables
that innovations and beauty emerge. Nihilism, the utter
freedom of constraints, would be like free verse, which
Robert Frost disdainfully referred to as “playing tennis
without the net.” Though these new values will place
new restrictions upon us, they do not make us less free
but rather more free. This result is because true freedom
for Nietzsche is not ‘freedom from restrictions’ but
the ‘freedom to become who we are’ (Z, 176) and this
freedom will grow as we subtract out of our lives all
resistances and frictions hampering us from becoming
who we are. This freedom is a “harmony among all of
a person’s preference schemes. It is a state in which
desire follows thought, and action follows desires,
without tension or struggle, and in which the distinction
between choice and constraint may well be thought to
disappear” (Nehamas, 187).  
To attain this freedom, we must daily engage in
what Nietzsche calls ‘self-overcoming.’ Self-overcoming is the process by which we progress toward a goal
through determined and persistent application of energy
and hard work. Say we want to become ‘brave.’ We
must first determine what being ‘brave’ will mean for
us — for “a virtue must be our own invention” (A, 11)
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— and then overcome our current ‘non-brave’ self to
manifest our newly posited, idiosyncratic definition of
bravery in actions.
Through the process of self-overcoming we will
become a new self. However, this does not mean that
our self-overcoming has achieved, or even can achieve,
its goal, for Nietzsche does not believe this process
does or should have any ultimate end or goal. Consider
Nietzsche’s parable: “Not every end is a goal. The end of
a melody is not its goal; but nonetheless, if the melody
had not reached its end it would not have reached its
goal either” (WS, 204). We are like this melody — keep
this in mind when reading the quotation that ends this
essay. Thus to return to our example of bravery, after we
have become ‘brave’ according to our own definition,
we will not sit on our laurels but instead posit a new,
even more demanding definition of bravery to fight to
attain. We will be like Faust who from desire rushes to
satisfaction and from satisfaction leaps to new desires.
It is through this self-overcoming that we will become
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“poets of our life — first of all in the smallest, most
everyday matters” (GS, 299).
In a great poem, every word and syllable is integral to the whole. As Saint Exupery put it: “You know
a work of art is finished not when there is nothing left
to add, but nothing left to take away.” Living life like a
work of art would, ideally, involve having every aspect
of your existence contribute to the poetic effect of the
whole, partake in your guiding taste, your “unity of
artistic style” (UM, 5). However we have one hulking
hindrance that seemingly blocks this endeavor: the
past. Though we can guide our becoming in the present
through self-overcoming, we seem to be powerless to
impose our guiding taste upon those parts of our life
that predate this taste. As Zarathustra initially laments:
“The will cannot will backwards … that is the will’s
loneliest melancholy” (Z, II, 20). However, he goes on
to offer an avenue — a certain way of living — that
would indeed allow the past to be brought into line
with our current style.
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One can use the psychological test of “the eternal
recurrence” to ascertain whether one is living in such
a manner. The test goes as such: What if a demon were
to “steal after you into your loneliest of loneliness and
say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived,
you will have to live once more and innumerable times
more …’” (GS, 341). Would you be satisfied enough with
how you have lived your life so far to say: “Yes! Once
more!” Or would you be terrified at the thought? Would
you plead with the demon to give you a ‘do-over?’ The
eternal recurrence test should inspire the self-creator to
live in a way that he or she would be willing to live it
eternal times more. This view makes every action and
event reverberate with eternal significance because
we have only this life to shape the wet cement of our
existence before it sets for eternity.
Essential to eternal recurrence is that no aspect
of our lives is unnecessary. If we were to change one
aspect or event of it, we would not be who we are, we
would be someone else. Nehamas puts it best: “a life
that was different in any way would simply not be our
life: it would be the life of a different person. To want
to be a different in any way is for Nietzsche to want
to be different in every way; it is to want, impossible
as that is, to be somebody else” (Nehamas, 156). The
self-creator wants only to be himself or herself.  She or
he will “learn more and more to see as beautiful what
is necessary in things” and acquire Amor fati, the love
of fate, which will in turn allow him or her to “be one
of those who make things beautiful” (GS, 276): that
is, a creator.

Why We Should Create Ourselves
This idea allows us to segue from ‘how’ one might create oneself as a work of art to grounds for ‘why’ one
might do so. Though Nietzsche never systematically
spelled out the various grounds on which he extolled
self-creation — or systematically spelled out any other
topic, for that matter — we can construct an interpretation from his body of work to divine his whys and
wherefores. Returning to our line of inquiry, consider
Zarathustra’s statement:
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy?
O my friends, then you have said Yes too to
all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared,
enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice,
if ever you said, ‘You please me, happiness!
Abide, moment!’ then you wanted all back.
All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared,
enamored (Z, IV, 19).
Self-creation is a method for affirming not only
some aspects of our life but all aspects of our life, and
indeed, of affirming all of life.  “Creation… is the great
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redemption from suffering” for we can affirm our woes
because “much bitter dying” is necessary so “that the
creator may be” (Z, 199). Thus, self-creation opens the
door to Nietzsche’s conception of redemption: “The
deep instinct for how one must live, in order to feel
oneself ‘in heaven,’ to feel ‘eternal,’ while in all other
behavior one decidedly does not feel ‘in heaven’ — this
alone is the psychological reality of ‘redemption.’ A new
way of life, not a new faith” (A, 33).
When we attain a new way of life through the
self-overcoming of our self-creation, we can feel ‘in
heaven,’ which means the feeling that we have overcome
ourselves, that we are ‘turning out well,’ that we have
Nietzsche’s conception of happiness: “The feeling that
power is growing, that resistance is overcome” (A, 2).
When we feel that we are ‘becoming who we are,’ we
redeem every aspect of our lives because all were necessary to bring us to this present. In this way we “will
backwards” and shape the fragments of our past — our
“it was” — into “thus I willed it” (Z, II, 20) by resetting
them into this newly created narrative of our selfhood.
However the preponderances of ‘I’s and ‘self’s in
this paper leads us to a criticism of Nietzsche’s concept
of self-creation and his philosophy in general: isn’t it
egoistic and narcissistic? What could be more conceited
than walking around saying “my great project is to live
my life as a great work of art?”  Could society function if
every member focused selfishly on his or her own life?
First of all, Nietzsche doesn’t believe anybody acts
unselfishly. We see this stance reflected in the quote:
“Magnanimity contains the same degree of egoism as
does revenge, but egoism of a different quality” (GS, 49).
Everybody ultimately does what she or he wants, thus
every action is egoistic: an instrument used to fulfill a
desire or drive. This is seen in Nietzsche’s critique of
the ascetic ideal or a more quotidian example: If you
are on a diet and you deny yourself food that you want
to eat, it may appear that you are not doing what you
want. However you are actually just choosing to satisfy
the desire to lose weight rather than the desire to have
sensual pleasure. Nietzsche interprets altruistic acts
in the same way.  Self-creators do not deceive themselves and compromise their intellectual conscience
by costuming egoism in the garb of altruism.
Though all our actions are inherently egoistic, as the
above quote shows, egoistic actions differ in terms of
quality. After admitting that we always do what we think
will achieve our wants, self-creation involves wanting
the right things. These ‘right things’ will be specific to
our own taste and ‘straight line and goal,’ but insofar
as we will want to create ourselves as someone ‘noble
and high’ and not ‘petty and low’ — admitting these
values are defined according to individual taste — we
will eschew the petty egoism of revenge that harms
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both avenger and target in favor of the noble egoism of
magnanimity. Honest egoism that avoids resentment is
good for both the egoist and the world at large because
Nietzsche believes resentment is harmful for both the

resenter and the target of resentment.
The hallmark of narcissism is excessive self-reflection; this was literally what entranced Narcissus.
Nietzsche attacked excessive self-reflection not only
on the grounds delineated above, i.e., that it can freeze
becoming into the stasis of being, but on the related
grounds that narcissism, excessive self-love, halts our
self-overcoming. If you ‘love yourself just the way you
are’ you won’t seek to improve on what you are. Thus
Nietzsche believes the self-creator will actually be concerned with people beside herself or himself. As he says:
“Morally speaking, neighbor love, living for others, and
other things can be a protective measure for preserving
the hardest self-concern. This is the exception where,
against my wont and conviction, I side with the ‘selfless’
drives: here they work in the service of self-love and
self-discipline” (EH, II, 9). Insofar as these altruistic motives and deeds prevent us from falling into the infinite
regress of full-blown narcissism, they actually turn out to
be our own best interest, as well as others. The ‘hardest
self concern’ involves not always being concerned with
yourself. Because self-creation involves the avoidance of
excessive self-reflection, it is not narcissistic.
The self-creator will actually manifest the ‘altruistic’
morals of the herd: “[Y]ou will always encounter [poverty, humility, and chastity] to a certain degree” in the
lives of “great, fruitful, inventive spirits” (GM, III, 8).
However the self-creator does not achieve this directly,
but as the unintentional result of his or her project of
self-creation. Because self-creation involves cultivating
certain desires, virtues, and projects, it necessarily entails
forgoing all other ‘non-essential’ desires, virtues and
projects. The self-creator forgoes these selfish desires
because he or she recognizes life as a zero-sum game.
She or he simply has better things to do than strive for
such transient self-gratification.
If we look at Nietzsche himself as representing the
self-creator or overman, we see that the overman, is not
some malevolent, egotistical wrecking ball smashing
everything in its wake as it follows its own trajectory.
Nietzsche, the ‘great immoralist,’ was a decent and polite
man. Though he would have hated the terms, he was
‘nice’ and ‘kind,’ someone whose last sane act was to
embrace a horse that was being cruelly beaten on the
streets of Turin. Though he ‘selfishly’ gave himself a personal categorical imperative, this morality was actually
stricter than those around him. Thus such an egoistic
project does not mean you will automatically exploit
and harm those around you.
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Indeed, Nietzsche suggests this selfish project will
help both oneself and others in two important ways.
First of all, the process of self-creation, of ‘giving style to
one’s character’ allows one to “attain satisfaction with
[oneself]” (GS, 290). This satisfaction is desirable because, for Nietzsche, petty and negative behavior stems
from dissatisfaction with oneself, from being ashamed
of who one is.  Ashamed persons seek ways of denying responsibility for having ‘turned out bad’ and thus
they seek to denigrate the world around them, whether
in general or particular people around them. When
Nietzsche says: “Whom do you call bad? — Those who
always want to put to shame” (GS, 73), he means these
dissatisfied people who devalue those around them in
order to bring others ‘down to their level.’  Conversely,
the self-satisfied, self-creative individual does not
‘bring others down’ but instead not only spares others
shame (GS, 74), but potentially ‘raises others up’ by
providing them an example of a liberated individual,
for Nietzsche considers “the seal of liberation” to be
“no longer…ashamed in front of oneself” (GS, 75). As

the maxim has it: You have to love yourself before
you can love someone else. Self-creation is a means
of becoming excellent and this in itself contributes
to both society and individual, for Nietzsche holds
that “civilized conditions” require “everyone [to be]
superior in one thing” for this allows the individual
to both “be helpful and…thus feel free to accept help
without a sense of shame” (HH, 509).
Secondly, the self-creative individual’s path to
self-creation is by no means entirely an ‘internal’ affair.
The creator will necessarily seek ways of externally
manifesting his or her virtues and talents, whether as a
painting, a building project, a book or, as in Nietzsche’s
case, a philosophy. Because this creation will manifest
the creator’s individual and idiosyncratic talents, will be
something that only she or he could have produced, he
or she will give the world something unique and never
before seen, thus pushing forward the possibilities of
what human beings are capable of producing.
Why will the creator externally manifest his or her
virtues? If we are what we do, the only way to be great
is to do something great. The creator will be such a fruitful and generative force, she or he will ‘flow over’ with
creativity and from this overflow will contribute to those
around him or her out of what Nietzsche calls the “giftgiving virtue.”  This gift-giving both benefits the giver
and the receiver. Thus the fruits of self-creation blur the
lines between altruism and egoism. The world is a better
place because, say, Beethoven ‘selfishly’ chose to chase
the limits of his talents as far they would take him.
This cultivated fruitfulness of the creator ultimately
creates that creator and his or her creation. This brings us
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to perhaps the most important reason for why one should
create one’s self. Nietzsche denies all otherworlds. Without God, Heaven, and the soul, it seems we are denied
the possibility of outliving our death, denied immortality.
However self-creation and its fruit, the creation of some
great work, offers us a path to a this-worldly immortality.
In death, when the creator “himself is now nothing but
the grey ashes” “the fire” kindled by his great works can
continue to blaze, thus when one considers that “every
action performed by a human being becomes in some
way the cause of other actions, decisions, thoughts,
that everything that happens is inextricably knotted to
everything that will happen, one comes to recognize
the existence of an actual immortality, that of motion”
(HH, 208). We live on to the extent that our actions
continue to produce effects in the world after our death.
Those self-creators who have cultivated greatness and
produced great works can achieve this secular immortality. By discussing and freshly interpreting Nietzsche’s
creations here, I have in a small manner perpetuated
and contributed to his “immortality of motion” set in
motion over a century ago.
We can question the worth of self-creation from
another perspective: Nietzsche’s perspectivism.   This
philosophical position poses problems for proselytizing:
because he denies that humans have access to universal
truths, he concludes that our conceptions of reality are
always subjective by virtue of the limited perspective
from which we observe them.   Science, freewill and
other treasured concepts are, ultimately, “necessary
fictions” that simplify, and thus falsify, reality into a
manageable shape. Nietzsche recognizes “untruth as a
condition of life” (BGE, 4). If this is so, does that not
mean that Nietzsche’s own philosophy is just another
assemblage of untruth? If so, why would we pick this
interpretation over another?
Nietzsche, to avoid being a self-deceptive hypocrite,
must admit that his philosophy is only an interpretation.
However this is not damning: according to this interpretation, interpretations are all we can have. To demand
more is impossible. To believe you have ‘The Truth’ is
to delude yourself out of a weakness of character that
demands a degree of certainty humanity is not capable
of attaining. The self-creating master merely desires
certainty, while the slave demands certainty (GS, 288).
Furthermore, some falsehoods are more false than others. All interpretations are not created equal. To interpret Nietzsche’s work as, say, a Christian apologetic is
certainly a worse interpretation than the one this paper
presents. Such an interpretation would be willfully
misreading reality or reading into it things that are not
there — which is what Nietzsche believes Christianity
does when it ‘reads into’ the ‘text’ of reality the unreal
realms of heaven and hell. Thus Nietzsche believes his
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untruths are less false than Christian untruths because
he has undertaken the creation of his worldview with
an ‘intellectual conscience’ that seeks the truth as much
as possible, though ultimate attainment will always
elude it.
Our worldview is intimately connected with our
morality and ourselves. All three interpenetrate and
influence the becoming of the others: thus the falsehoods we live by influence who we become, who we
are.  Nietzsche’s ultimate grounds for favoring his philosophy over others is that he believes it will produce
a better you, a better humanity, usually expressed with
the metaphor of ‘health.’  His philosophy will make you
‘healthy’ enough to achieve great things. But this just
continues the shell game of justification. What makes
something healthy? For Nietzsche, something is healthy
to the extent that it is ‘life-promoting.’  Because “[l]ife
itself is to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power” (A, 6),
life-promoting or healthy acts are those that make us
grow in power and durability. But this definition of life,
which is the basis of these valuations, is itself another
interpretation, another untruth. Without recourse to
a universal ground of morality, Nietzsche cannot ultimately justify why his values are better than others. To
justify something means to judge it necessary or right
according to criteria outside of the situation justified.
Nietzsche’s denial of a humanly knowable absolute
truth lying outside of human understanding precludes
the possibility of these outside criteria.

The impossibility of external justification for our
project of self-creation brings us back to our theme
of ‘living life like a work of art.’ Now we can see that
this trope appealed to Nietzsche precisely because art
creates its own justification. Great works of art justify
themselves not by recourse to some outside source,
say a literary theory, but from within, from the very
appeal of their appearance. This is the meaning behind
Nietzsche’s statement: “Only as an aesthetic product
can the world be justified to all eternity” (BT, 5). When
Nietzsche later ‘revises’ this statement to only “as an
aesthetic phenomenon” is existence “still bearable for
us” (GS, 107) he is simply taking his original thought
to its logical conclusion: if we live our life artfully, we
ourselves are our own justification for ourselves; as such,
this project of living ever more artfully gives a meaning
to our life, a why to life. This project makes life bearable
by giving meaning to our suffering, for man will endure
any how so long as he has a why.

Ultimately life is “full of sound and fury/signifying nothing” (Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, Scene
V).  But why should we use the words “ultimately
meaningless” with a slanderous intent? The notion
of “ultimate meaning” is nonsensical. We should not
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condemn the world for not being as we would like it
to be. We should take the world as it is. Like it or not,
this world and this life are the only ones we have.
The philosophy and the philosopher that Nietzsche
created orbit around one goal: not just to ‘like’ the
way things are, but to love them, to affirm life in such
a world. This is the mindset of the noble free spirit, the
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